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This article analyses the role of HRM practices in the implementation of an innovative
cross-functional approach to new product development (concurrent engineering, CE)
in Eurotech Industries. Contrary to CE methodology stipulations, and despite
supportive conditions, HRM received scant attention in the implementation process.
Organizational power and politics were clearly involved in this situation, and this
article explores how their play created such HRM ‘absences’. The article builds on a
four-dimensional view of power in order to provide a deeper understanding of the
embedded, interdependent and political nature of HRM practice and innovation.
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Introduction
There is no doubt about the importance of innovation. As markets become increasingly
globalized and competitive, and the pace of technological change grows, it is now widely
accepted that organizations have to compete more in terms of the time-to-market
and innovativeness of their products. Innovation is considered essential for successful
business performance in response to task and institutional environments (Dougherty and
Hardy 1996; Mavondo, Chimhanzi and Stewart 2004). Effective innovation of products
and organizational processes has, therefore, become the focus of considerable interest for
policy makers, managers and academics (Fagerberg, Mowery and Nelson 2005).
In their review of the relevant literatures, de Leede and Looise (2005) found that most
approaches to innovation management entail an important role for HRM. However, while
innovation management scholars have devoted considerable attention to such issues
(e.g., human resource development, rewards, career management and team building),
HRM researchers have largely tended to ignore innovation (Laursen and Foss 2003). This
study seeks to redress this lacuna by examining how HRM issues were dealt with in a case
study of process innovation. It explores why these issues were not given adequate
consideration.
Our case involved an in-depth processual study of a project that sought to introduce
concurrent engineering (CE) – a ‘best practice’ cross-functional approach to new product
development used in many manufacturing industries – in the Australian subsidiary of a
European manufacturer of military electronics systems (Eurotech Industries). Our aim was
to acquire a deeper understanding of the role of HRM practices in process innovation
through a longitudinal study of CE implementation. Accordingly we focused on the ways
that HRM issues were considered, from both line management and HRM specialist
perspectives.
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Shortly after the study commenced, it became apparent that HRM was receiving scant
attention in the implementation of CE, contrary to CE methodology stipulations. Despite
favourable rhetoric, and a number of supportive conditions, detailed consideration of
HRM in the project was conspicuous by its absence. It was clear from the case study that at
a number of levels, organizational power and politics contributed to this situation, and
this increasingly became our focus as the investigation proceeded. The study shows
how, despite rhetoric to the contrary, organizations involved in implementing process
innovations such as CE, can more or less systematically fail to address key HRM
issues. It also explores how the play of politics and power create such ‘absences’. We argue
that the experience of Eurotech is indicative, and we discuss how an understanding of the
role of HRM in innovation can be enriched by systematically drawing on an analysis of
organizational politics which theorizes different forms and sources of power. In so doing,
we contribute to the literature on HRM practice and innovation (e.g., Searle and Ball 2003;
Jime´nez-Jime´nez and Sanz-Valle 2005) by introducing a political process perspective.
Concurrent engineering and the neglect of HRM
CE seeks to achieve a balance between organizational, technological and human factors
in the design and development of new products. It is a prime example of the kind of
sociotechnical, cross-functional practice recommended by many exponents of process
innovation. Its underlying philosophy espouses ‘the integrated and concurrent design of
products and their related manufacturing processes’ (Winner, Pennell, Bertrand and
Slusarczuk 1988, p. v). CE aims to overcome disintegration in the product development
process by realizing cross-functional integration (i.e. through high levels of co-ordination,
co-operation and communication), the integration of design (i.e. by considering product
life cycle issues from the first stages of design), and a high level concurrence between
project tasks in terms of overlaps and parallel activities (Clausing 1994; Haddad 1996;
Fleischer and Liker 1997). It is thus presented as a way to overcome the traditional
segmented, functionally specialized and largely sequential product development process.
Different approaches to CE give more or less weight to technology, processes and
people in overcoming such problems. Within an underlying engineering perspective on
CE (the dominant strand), the emphasis is on technology and tools such as Computer
Aided Design (CAD), Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM), Computer Integrated
Manufacturing (CIM), and rapid prototyping (e.g., Parsaei and Sullivan 1993; Ranky
1994). It is people and processes, however, that are the focus within the managerial CE
literature, including procedural and organizational means to break down functional ‘silos’
(e.g., Lettice, Smart, and Evans 1995; Haddad 1996). While the traditional emphasis
in the CE literature has been on technological mechanisms, it has been recognized that
the human resource dimension can be decisive for the successful constitution and
implementation of cross-functional CE processes (e.g., DeLorge 1992; Hull, Collins,
and Liker 1996). This includes the management of cross-functional teams and
organizational support for such teams (e.g., team leadership, size, sponsorship, member
and leader selection, training and empowerment), as well as appropriate HR policies and
practices (Holahan and Markham 1996). Clearly, there are a number of key areas where
HRM policies and practices could support and facilitate CE, e.g., performance appraisal,
measurement and reward, training and development, selection and staffing, pay and
promotion, job design, career management, employee relations, and the development of a
receptive organizational culture (Campion and Higgs 1995).
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 563
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Although the role of HRM as a specialist function has not been specifically addressed
in the CE literature (Zanko, Couchman, Badham, Schubert and Zainuddin 1998), HR
issues relevant for cross-functional integration have attracted some attention, e.g., team
building (Thamhain and Wilemon 1987), team leadership (Susman and Rayl 1999),
team processes and performance (Hauptman and Hirji 1996), and the importance of
supportive recruitment training and other team-oriented HRM policies and practices
(Gerwin and Susman 1996). Generally, however, the treatment of HRM issues in relation
to CE has been limited and inadequate (a neglect also found in other areas of technology
implementation, e.g., Bondarouk and Looise 2005). While many of the HRM issues in
regard to such matters as establishing cross-functional teams have been raised, they are
relatively sparse in comparison to the focus on technological means. The CE literature,
and indeed the innovation literature generally (de Leede and Looise 2005; Fagerberg
2005), remains shallow with regard to the role of HRM, despite its apparent significance.
There are, for example, no in-depth studies of the implementation of CE from an
organizational viewpoint, or any analysis of the role of HRM in this process (Schubert
and Couchman 1998). Further, the broader organizational HRM issues raised by the
integration requirements of CE have been generally neglected. No detailed research has
been conducted, for example, on the HRM implications for functional units with the
establishment of cross-functional teams (such as the loss of expertise for the function, and
the locus of responsibility for career management or professional development).
As Zanko et al. (1998, p. 132) observed, the HR issues associated with CE ‘are treated
broadly in isolation from other HRM activities; no account is made of the need for
functional integration – where HRM program areas need to be treated and linked
as a systemically related whole’. Yet any comprehensive HRM approach to CE (and
innovation more generally) needs to take account of HRM as both a specialist function
and organization-wide activity. As a generic organization-wide activity, HRM comprises
all of the organization’s efforts, services and intentions, both explicit and covert, towards
the management of its employees. It finds its expression through HR strategy, policies and
practices, and is thus represented by all of the HRM stakeholder groups – especially HRM
executives and professionals, line management and senior management (Tyson and Fell
1986). This is consonant with Boxall and Purcell’s (2003) contextually embedded notion
of HRM that covers all workforce groups, involves line and specialist managers,
incorporates a variety of management styles and considers individual and collective
aspects of work and employment.
Exacerbating this lack of comprehensive treatment, existing explanations of the role of
HRM in CE and product innovation have also tended to be universalistic and prescriptive in
nature (Atuahene-Gima 1996; Couchman, Badham and Zanko 1999). The situation has been
largely presented in terms of a ‘one best way’ of CE organization and ‘one best set’ of HRM
practices for supporting such arrangements. Yet, as has long been recognized, the kinds of
cross-functional integration recommended by CE can be brought about in many different
ways (Zanko et al. 1998). The decision to form a cross-functional team is, for example, more
complex, resource intensive and risky from an HRM perspective than the creation of a liaison
role, yet less structurally significant than the establishment of separate divisions or forms of
matrix organization. Few studies have discussed the appropriateness of CE for different
industries, organizations, product types and markets (Poolton and Barclay 1996), and even
fewer have discussed how different contexts might lead to different methods for realising
cross-functional integration. While cross-functional teams are widely seen as a critical
success factor for CE (Trygg 1993), these may vary widely along structural and process
dimensions, and they may have differing levels of autonomy (Wheelwright and Clark 1992).
M. Zanko et al.564
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Furthermore, different phases of the development process may require different types of
interdependence and co-ordination, and thus different HRM practices.
In addition to the above, there is another glaring omission in the CE literature: there
has been no consideration of the organizational politics surrounding such cross-functional
initiatives or the practice of HRM in these initiatives. As we shall see, this political
dimension emerged as crucially significant in addressing HRM issues associated with CE
at Eurotech. Before addressing the details of the case study, however, we provide a brief
overview of the state of play in regard to HRM, innovation and organizational politics, and
introduce the ‘four-dimensional’ framework employed in the analysis.
HRM and innovation: Addressing power and politics
The existence of complexity, uncertainty and multiple interests inevitably generates
organizational politics (Pfeffer 1992; Buchanan and Badham 2008). Badham (2005) and
McLoughlin and Badham (2005) contend that the implementation of process innovation
is just such a situation, as it is for product innovation (Jones and Stevens 1998). Rather
than being a neutral, passive or reactive process, it is a site of ‘reinvention’, ‘mutual
adaptation’, ‘configuration’ and ‘reconfiguration’. It is only to be expected, therefore, that
what ‘CE’ is defined to be, what the associated HRM ‘requirements’ are taken to be, and
how CE is to be implemented is an arena of politics and power. While, arguably, all
features of organizational life have a political dimension, the implementation of complex
process innovations is a prime site of multiple cross-cutting political activities and
agendas. Despite their prevalence and importance for organizational outcomes, however,
organizational power and politics have been given scant treatment in the established HRM
literature (e.g. Galang and Ferris 1997; Al-Arkoubi and McCourt 2004; Edwards and
Kuruvilla 2005). It is not surprising, therefore, that a review of the literature on CE
uncovered no systematic investigation of the bearing of organizational power and politics
in this area. The processual, complex and political nature of CE implementation remains
poorly understood, and it remains an ambiguous and vague concept with considerable
interpretive flexibility. More generally, our knowledge about politics and organization-
level innovation is ‘fragmentary’ (Fagerberg 2005, p. 20), and we would argue that this is
due to ‘a failure to study innovation within the context of meaning, knowledge and
understanding of the organization as a key unit of analysis’ (Storey and Salaman 2005,
p. 7). How then to proceed in addressing this failure?
Power, politics and HRM
In their analysis of ‘the politics of failure and the failure of politics’, Buchanan and
Badham (1999) explore how vertical organizational hierarchies and horizontal functional
‘silos’ have acted to resist and restrict many ‘best practice’ cross-functional innovations
such as total quality management, business process re-engineering, teamworking and
concurrent engineering. Their analysis remains, however, primarily at the level of the
explicit self-interested politics of organizational sub-cultures and does not directly address
the role of HRM. In order to broaden this analysis, and integrate a consideration of HRM,
it is useful to return to the now-classic analyses of Legge (1978) and Townley (1994).
What these analyses provide are very different intellectual perspectives that can be
drawn upon to extend our understanding of how politics and power affect the manner in
which HRM issues are considered (or excluded from consideration) in the course of
organizational innovation.
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 565
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The essence of Legge’s (1978) argument is that HRM, as both a function and specialist
department, requires power and influence in order to implement its prescriptions, and so
overcome the tendency to be neglected through line management misunderstanding of the
role of HRM and perceptions of HRM departments as being out of touch with line
management’s problems. Legge (1978) views the logical means for increasing the power
of the HRM function in organizational decision-making as being acquired through
non-substitutable expertise (e.g., to handle legislative developments and the implementation
of organizational change), but only to the extent that this expertise is perceived by
management as strategic to the organization. For the personnel specialist (and department),
she posits two approaches to achieving authoritative professionalism. ‘Conformist
innovation’ involves ‘acquiring expertise that will enable him [sic] to demonstrate a closer
relationship between his activities (means) and organizational success criteria (ends)’ (Legge
1978, p. 79). This efficiency orientation is achieved through stabilization and auditing
activities, such as ensuring reward policies are authorized before enactment, and checking
safety management systems effectiveness. The ‘deviant innovator’, in contrast, ‘attempts to
change this means/ends relationship by gaining acceptance for a different set of criteria for the
evaluation of organizational success and his contribution to it’ (Legge 1978, p. 85).
Organizational development and legislation are considered the primary bases for achieving
such personnel-oriented effectiveness.
In her focus on the conscious and active role of organizational actors in the
competition for resources, Legge’s analysis is usefully supplemented by Pettigrew’s
(1974, p. 27) exploration of how organizational specialists such as HRM professionals ‘do
not merely advise’ but ‘persuade, negotiate and exercise the power they can mobilise’.
In so doing, he argues, they utilize (or fail to utilize) five power sources: their expertise,
control over information, political access, perceived status and support from their own
and other specialist groups. According to this view, the HRM professional, like other
specialists, needs to establish credibility to be effective. This involves anticipating the
varying needs, expectations and reference groups of different executives and specialists
involved in, or affected by, a HR project. Those who focus on their own tasks, become
preoccupied with the intricacies of their own expertise, and only see clients when task
issues are involved are unlikely to be able to be very effective at this anticipation.
Successful specialists, on the other hand, develop multiple relationships with significant
players in a project, and succeed in demonstrating their credibility and competence in
areas salient to these other actors.
While Buchanan and Badham (1999) argue that such ‘power skills’ are crucial for all
professional innovators, Townley’s (1994) work directs our attention to another dimension
of politics and power: the way in which the exercise of politics and power is embedded in
the often taken-for-granted organizational norms and arrangements within which the more
open cut-and-thrust of interest group politics is played out. It is this more ‘unobtrusive’ or
‘covert’ arena of power that many analysts regard as essential for any complete
understanding of organizational politics (Lukes 1974; Hardy 1996; Hardy and Leiba-
O’Sullivan 1998). Like Legge (1978), Townley (1994) argued that HRM practices
had been largely treated by researchers as prescriptive tools for the achievement of
organizational goals, and there was a notable reluctance to address the issue of power.
However, unlike Legge, she contended that from a Foucauldian perspective, power is not
something to be possessed like a commodity. It is relational and embedded in nature and
is exercised through practices. Power intersects and is exercised through knowledge by
way of governmentality: ‘those processes through which objects are rendered amenable
to intervention and regulation by being formulated in a particular conceptual way’
M. Zanko et al.566
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(Townley 1994, p. 6). To be managed, work and people must be known and visible, and
power is involved in bringing this about.
In Townley’s approach, power relations are viewed as endemic to all aspects and levels of
working life, and in the practice of HRM they are mobilized through techniques which create
knowledge of, and power over, the workforce (e.g., human resource planning), the work
(e.g., work study and job design), and the individual worker (e.g., selection and performance
appraisal). There is indeed a ‘myriad of power relations at the micro-level of society, the
mundane, the taken for granted, day-to-day experiences which directly affect people at work’
(Townley 1994, p. 10). The resultant system of knowledge (i.e. of rules and categories)
constitutes HRM discourse and forms the basis for controlling and ordering the employment
relationship. As Townley (1994, p. 136) put it, ‘HRM is a discourse and technology of power
that aims to resolve the gap in the contract of employment between the capacity to work and
its exercise and, thereby, organize individual workers in a collective, productive power
or force’. For any deeper understanding of organizational politics in relation to the role
of HRM in process innovation, a significant implication of Townley’s approach is that it
is necessary to engage with the ubiquity of the webs of power relations and to recognize their
local and specific nature in the articulation of ‘panoptic’ HRM techniques.
The multi-dimensional nature of power in organizational politics
In further exploration of why many of the HRM issues raised by process innovations such
as CE are not substantively addressed during implementation, the above approaches
draw our attention to the multi-faceted nature of power and politics in organizations.
To achieve a deeper understanding of the dynamics of power in contexts such as those of
our case study, it is necessary to combine and extend such perspectives in a multi-
dimensional analysis. Accordingly, we turned to recent attempts to build on Lukes’ (1974)
classic ‘three-dimensional’ view to establish a more complex ‘four-dimensional’ view
of organizational politics and power (e.g., Fulop and Linstead 2004; Fleming and
Spicer forthcoming). Specifically, we drew on Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan’s (1998)
conceptualization, developed in their study of the failure of employee empowerment
programmes during the 1990s, in terms of the politics of resources, processes, meaning,
and systems.
In developing their four-dimensional approach, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998,
pp. 452–3) begin by arguing that:
power is exercised, in the first dimension, by using various resources to influence the outcome
of decision-making processes, in the second dimension, by controlling access to those
processes, and, in the third dimension, through hegemonic processes, by which we mean
the legitimation of power through cultural and normative assumptions.
In a one-dimensional analysis, the focus is on the observable actions of players and how
these influence the outcomes of decision-making processes (e.g., reaching consensus on
critical business issues). The second dimension expands the one-dimensional view by
including non-decision-making. Non-decision-making is seen as ‘a means by which
demands for change . . . can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert, or
killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these
things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementation stage of the policy process’
(Lukes 1974, p. 44). For proponents of the two-dimensional view, control of the agenda
and of the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political arena is a critical
power issue. The conscious or unconscious creation of barriers is used to suppress
certain conflicts and decisions while enabling the exploitation of others. The one- and
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 567
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two-dimensional views are based on individualistic behavioural theory which does not
include social forces. Thus these views fail to adequately conceptualize the complexity
and organizational embeddedness of power and politics, including their dependence on
structures, cultures, norms, expectations and the historical context (Buchanan and Badham
1999; Thomas 1994).
By contrast, the three-dimensional view of power goes beyond the reductionism
inherent in behavioural accounts. It does so by offering a sociological perspective for
investigating power and the various, often complex and subtle, ways of suppressing latent
conflicts within a particular social context. It includes individuals as well as collectives
(e.g., in the form of social forces or institutional practices) to explain decision-making and
control over the political agenda. The three-dimensional view explains not only how
political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues, but also the social factors
involved in preventing such demands from being recognized and considered in the first
place. This approach helps us to understand how particular concerns or grievances (often
only partly understood or expressed) are never formulated, either inside or outside a political
system, into consciously articulated interests. Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) note that
Lukes extends our understanding of the way in which the more powerful groups or
institutions impose a ‘hegemony’ over the thoughts and consciousness of the less powerful,
such that a challenge to power and authority becomes, literally, ‘inconceivable’.
However, while the three-dimensional view usefully focuses our attention on this
often unrecognized area of ‘covert’ or ‘unobtrusive’ power, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan
(1998) emphasize the need to go beyond this to explore a more systemic fourth dimension
of power. This Foucauldian-based dimension refers to the complex, multifaceted, and
pervasive exercise of power that occurs in a way which no one can control (there is no
single decisive agent of power) or escape from (drawing attention to the limitations
of resistance). From this perspective, power and politics are embedded in our system of
being. The systemic and all-pervasive nature of such webs of power lie behind the
discursive construction of organizational practice and identity, making alternative
discourses ‘difficult to conceive of, let alone enact’ (Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan 1998,
p. 460), an approach which is congruent with Townley’s (1994) conceptualization of HRM
as a discourse and technology of power.
Through our case study we will explore how these dimensions of politics and power
played out in the introduction of CE at Eurotech Industries, and we identify a range of
issues that should be taken up in further research on the politics of HRM and innovation.
The case study: Eurotech Industries and the CE project
Methodology
The research design involved a double-loop process. In the first loop, a preliminary case
study was undertaken in a heavy manufacturing firm to identify and understand the HRM
issues that manufacturing companies encounter in dealing with CE, and to refine the
conceptual framework for the main study. The second loop formed the main investigation
(reported here), and was based on a longitudinal case study of Eurotech’s attempts to define
and implement CE. The study sought to understand the nature of the process and the
dynamics of change, but had a particular focus on the role of HRM therein. Yin’s (1989) case
study framework guided the development of the case research design. Data collection
was mainly qualitative, involving participant observation, interviews with company
representatives, and the analysis of company documents. The processual approach adopted
provided deep insights into the daily routines and subtle organizational phenomena that
M. Zanko et al.568
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shaped the CE implementation process, the roles of people surrounding the implementation
team, as well as the formal and informal interactions of the team with other individuals,
projects and departments (Dawson 1994, 2003).
The observation programme entailed regular visits to the company over an 18-month
period, totalling about 140 days, to attend meetings of the CE Project Team (held twice
a week) and other relevant events (e.g., meetings of the CE Pilot Project Team and
fortnightly meetings of the Engineering Department). The collection of observational data
was complemented by formal and informal, in-depth and open-ended interviews with key
players in the project and the company. Thirty-nine formal interviews were conducted, each
ranging from 30 minutes to 2 hours, with an average time of 40 minutes. The interviewees
included five representatives from senior management level (among them the two
Managing Directors), eight people from middle management such as functional and project
managers, and 13 non-managerial staff. Among the latter group were members from the CE
Project Team and the Pilot Project as well as other employees involved in the design and
development process. Repeat interviews were performed with 13 interviewees. The repeat
interviews not only allowed clarification of contradictory data, but also further exploration
of discoveries such as the non-involvement of the HRM Department in the design and
implementation of CE. In addition to the formal interviews, informal discussions (from 10
to 60 minutes each) were held with staff from all levels of the company throughout the
study. These were an additional source to verify information gathered through other means
and to provide further background information about the company and its industry.
The data were subjected to a systematic qualitative analysis following ‘three
concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/ver-
ification’ (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 10). The three independent sources of evidence
(interviews, observations and documents) enabled the contextualization, cross-check and
cross-validation of data (Stake 2005). The use of a formal case study protocol and the
development of a case study database aimed to increase the reliability and replicability of
the findings.
The context for CE at Eurotech Industries
Eurotech Industries was a medium-sized company, originally established in New South
Wales in the 1950s. From 1990, it operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of a European
multinational corporation. Its core business was defence electronics and its primary
customer was the Australian Government. It designed, developed, manufactured and
provided technical support for complex systems, including surveillance and electronic
equipment, communication systems and air traffic control systems. Eurotech was a
profitable enterprise in the sense that it performed well in its industry and kept winning
contracts. However, profit margins had decreased over time. Defence electronics was
a rapidly changing sector with less government funding available, higher levels of
international competition in a formerly protected market and a more demanding approach to
procurement by its primary customer. In this emergent environment, Eurotech’s traditional,
linear approach to product development was proving no longer tenable: nearly all of its
product development projects were marked by schedule over-runs and budget blow-outs.
At the time of the study, Eurotech Industries was running about 20 projects of various
sizes, which were handled by 10 project managers. According to a Project Manager
‘big projects have one full-time project manager; with small projects, one project
manager can handle two to four projects’, but even the big development projects did not
have a permanent project team. Employees were drawn from their functional departments
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 569
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when required for a clearly-defined task, and were mostly allocated part-time reporting to
a project manager. Eurotech Industries’ product development process was marked by a
lack of integrated thinking and action, and projects were conducted in a conventional
linear-sequential way.
Formally, each function and project within Eurotech was jointly managed by a technical
manager and a business administration manager, a ‘double-head’ structure which had been
imposed by the parent company in Germany. It was accompanied by the introduction of a
second managing director, a representative from the parent company, filling the position
of the Managing Director Business Administration. However, this second executive
effectively had deputy status, with final decision-making power remaining with the de facto
CEO of the company, the Technical Managing Director. The company’s main decision-
making body, the Executive Committee, was made up of the Technical Managing Director
(TMD), the Managing Director Business Administration, the Engineering Director, the
Director of Quality Assurance, the Manufacturing Director, the Director of Material
Planning and Control and the Finance Director. Sales and Projects were represented on this
Committee by the Technical Managing Director. The Head of the HR Department was
neither a director nor a member of the Executive Committee.
Eurotech’s culture was described by one senior manager as ‘laid a bit backwards, living
still a bit in the past’. This attitude was accompanied by a focus on individual performance in
contrast to teamwork. Many managers did not recognize people management as a critical
part of their responsibility, or employees as a key factor in achieving desired organizational
performance and success. Another prevailing behaviour pattern was a so-called ‘culture of
blame’. This could be seen in the low tolerance towards failure, and proved a barrier in the
implementation of CE. The engineering background of many managers and employees in
the company was another factor that determined Eurotech’s culture. About one third of the
360 staff (and most managers) were professional engineers, change agents mostly had a
technology background.
HRM was fundamentally neglected in a specialist and generic organizational sense.
The incumbent HR Manager had been appointed in an essentially ‘clerk of works’ role, and
was neither a director nor a member of the Executive Committee. The HR Department had
low status. None of its nine staff had a degree or other formal qualifications in personnel
management or HRM. The TMD limited the HR Department to operational duties and
welfare provision, and saw the role of HRM to be ‘more in the soft factors, to look after
[the employees]’. The HR Department had a short-term planning horizon, a low-level of
discretion, and was subservient to line management. The department did not even meet the
limited expectations of change project leaders and other managers regarding its HRM
contributions within the company’s change programme.
At the beginning of the initiatives to improve Eurotech’s performance (discussed
below), HRM activities were still of low importance to many line managers. These
managers had not recognized the value of HRM nor their own responsibility for it. They
had little or no training or qualification in HRM. Nevertheless, they felt confident
about dealing with HR issues and considered their efforts in this area as sufficient. Despite
this, internal surveys identified HRM as one of the weakest managerial areas and showed
that most managers in Eurotech Industries largely underestimated the complexity and
difficulty of HRM. Consequently, the company provided various training sessions on
HRM and related issues and stimulated a discussion of various HR topics. The TMD
claimed HRM to be of highest importance to the company and saw himself as a main
stakeholder of HRM, though he did not always act as such.
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The CE Project at Eurotech
The initiative to restructure Eurotech’s development processes arose out of an efficiency
programme instigated by its German parent to improve profitability and the capability to
respond to tightening industry conditions. External business consultants were brought in
to carry out a detailed analysis of Eurotech’s work processes and, as a result of their
recommendations, six individual projects were set up under the umbrella of a ‘Time
Optimized Processes’ (TOP) change programme. CE was identified as offering considerable
promise for improving the quality, cost and timeliness of development projects. In accepting
this, as well as other proposed change projects, Eurotech’s senior management made an
agreement with the parent company targeting a 50% cycle time reduction and 30% cost
reduction within two years.
The preceding discussion reveals a number of conditions favourable for the introduction
of CE at Eurotech: increasing industry competition with cost reduction and
quality improvement demands from the customer, parent company endorsement, senior
management commitment, and a company whose operations were project-based. The CE
Project was formally given the task of developing a concept for the restructuring of the
design and development process based on CE principles (as discussed above). Eight months
after its inception, the CE Project Team proposed a CE ‘solution set’ and the selection of a
CE Pilot Project. Four months later, the CE Project Team and senior management had
identified a Pilot Project and agreed on a timetable for its implementation.
The initial CE project team comprised five, then six members, including the team
leader. The team members represented only a few of the company’s functions, and all had a
technical background. They were mostly junior employees or contractors. They were ‘not
high profile people, just people the company thought it could spare’, claimed a member of
the CE Project Team. The team members worked part-time on the project and were not
collocated. Work on the project was generally not seen as rewarding by the team members.
The CE Project Leader was a systems engineer who reinforced the team’s technical bias.
He concentrated on tools, techniques and procedures, seeing CE as little more than good
systems engineering practice. Scant attention was given to the organizational and HRM
implications of CE, though other team members often raised such issues. He gave limited
consideration to people issues such as common goal setting, open discussions, good
communication and information sharing and performance recognition. This was reflected in
his authoritarian leadership style, which lacked a team orientation. He tended to treat team
members as subordinates, and did not train or develop them for the project. He dominated
the team and did not easily delegate responsibility. He sidelined or ignored people who held
different views from him, including those on the team and external project partners.
CE training for the technical staff at Eurotech (a necessary step to disseminate the
proposed changes) was conducted at a stage when a pilot product development project had
not been selected. The CE Project Team had not tested its proposed CE concept and,
therefore, had no experience with its actual application. In addition, senior management
and the CE Project Team were still struggling to build up a coherent vision of CE, a
common understanding about what CE meant for Eurotech. Many organizational and HR
related issues were raised during the training, such as the future role of functional
managers, but remained unanswered.
When a pilot product development project was eventually selected, it was not an ideal
case to trial the concept. This ‘pilot’ project was already at a stage where conceptual
design of the product was mostly completed. Thus, the proposed ‘CE solution set’ could
not be fully applied, particularly in terms of initial team-building, common goal setting or
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formulating a team charter. A year after its establishment, the CE Project Team convened
a workshop in order to review its achievements and representatives from the CE pilot
project participated in this. The workshop concluded that the outcome of the CE Project
was rather modest at that stage.
After 18 months, the CE Project was still not wholly successful and certainly the
expected time and cost reductions from introducing CE were nowhere near realization.
At the end of the investigation, the project had not achieved the anticipated high level of
integration of departmental functions and product design. No significant HRM policies or
practices to support this integration had been considered or implemented. However,
although the success of the CE Project was limited, and CE had not been fully applied at
the end of the investigation, the concept of CE had gained some momentum in the
company. The proposed concept conveyed a vision of a future development process that
corresponded with Eurotech’s business reorientation, with its move towards teamwork and
process innovation.
Explaining CE project outcomes at Eurotech
In what ways can an organizational politics and power perspective explain the course of
the CE project and the ways in which HRM issues were considered or excluded? In this
section, we begin by examining the influence of certain key players, proceed to explore
some of the contextual influences on the actions of these players, and conclude with
comments on how a four-dimensional analysis of power can help us gain a more complete
understanding of the dynamics of power in organizational process innovation.
The players
Senior management
According to the Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, senior
management initially classified the CE Project as a ‘first priority’. Yet the history of the
project appeared to show otherwise. Members of the Executive Committee failed to link
CE with other change projects and initiatives, in particular another highly relevant TOP
project on Organizational and Cultural Change (OCC). The CE project’s apparent lower
status treatment by the executives was implicitly recognized throughout the organization.
According to one CE Project Team member, CE received ‘the most support from the least
powerful people on the Executive Committee’. The most powerful figure on the Executive
Committee, the Technical Managing Director, did not take on the project’s sponsorship
and its formal sponsor, the Engineering Director, had little interest in it. The CE Project
was given resources in the form of personnel time to develop a CE concept and to conduct
training, but it remained very much an engineering project focused on the procedures of
design and development. In the year following the project’s inception, the Technical
Managing Director and other senior managers did not actively support the
conceptualization and implementation of CE, especially the more far-reaching changes,
as proposed by the CE Team.
The Technical Managing Director (TMD) saw no major strategic role for HRM
or its relevance for CE. This was most apparent in his restriction of the role of the
HR Department to one that was reactive to change. A few years earlier, the previous HR
Manager had been on the Executive Committee and was an active advisor to senior and
middle management. His successor, an internal appointment by the TMD, who had
previously been an accountant and salary administrator, was given a limited role with no
executive function. The TMD explained the situation as follows:
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What we call the [HRM] strategy alignment, is done by me. I am the sponsor. That is not run
by the HR Department. And I don’t see that it can be done by them. Because I don’t want him
[the HR Manager] to know as much as I do . . . this is my role . . . If HRM could do it, I could
go home . . . If they’d do it, we’d be duplicating functions.
‘Strategy alignment’ (of human resources with company strategy) was seen by the TMD,
as de facto CEO, to be very much his responsibility and beyond the purview of the HR
Department. The TMD clearly saw his role as:
To make certain that people know where the company is going, what our mission is . . . that is
what strategy alignment is . . . To make sure that people go in the right direction and [are] all
thinking in a similar way.
He justified the limited role of the HR Manager as follows:
He [the HR Manager] can’t be the front-runner. He just wouldn’t know what is the sharp end
of our business to succeed in the marketplace. If he knew that, he would not be Personnel
Manager, or Human Resources Manager . . . What kind of company you want to have really
comes down to people. That is the sort of thing that has to come from here [points to himself].
You can’t leave it to your [businessman] or your HR man or whomever.
Following initiation of the TOP Program, the TMD proclaimed an increased interest in
HRM. This was reflected in the establishment of an Organizational and Cultural Change
Project (OCC) that the TMD decided to sponsor (but he then appointed someone other than
the HRM Manager as the leader, again indicating the limited strategic role ascribed to this
function). At this stage, the TMD appeared to espouse a more strategic approach to HRM, as
well as a move towards more a ‘sophisticated human relations’ style of HR management.
Yet, despite this, when the OCC project recommended a strengthening of HRM strategy
and the HR department, the TMD opposed this and it did not happen. Adding to his
entrenched views on HRM, and deriving from his engineering background, he tended to
favour technical solutions to organizational problems. In the case of CE, for example,
this was illustrated in his quick approval to purchase software to support face-to-face
communication and information exchange in development projects, but he gave no such
approval for team building training for the CE Project or Pilot Project teams.
The formal power of the TMD over the CE Project was due to his control over which
projects in the company were initiated and how they were supported. Projects he supported
– such as the OCC project – were sponsored by him personally, and ‘front-runners’ among
the suite of corporate projects were given most of the time and financial resources they asked
for. Other projects, towards which he was less supportive, ended up with less time and
resources, and were staffed with less experienced or qualified people and less powerful
project leaders.
Other directors of the technical departments on the Executive Committee also exerted
a strong influence on projects in general, and the CE Project in particular. As heads of the
production-related functional departments, it was their authority over crucial resources
that determined whether particular projects faced frequent resourcing problems or were
given a far easier ‘ride’. The lack of interest in the CE project by its sponsor, the
Engineering Director, was accompanied by a similar lack of interest and even mild
opposition from the other directors.
Middle management
A number of functional managers, with control over the resources needed by projects,
neither participated in important CE meetings or training sessions nor sent substitutes
(e.g., Material Planning and Control, Sales and Marketing). Some did not provide
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 573
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
NA
SP
 - 
Pa
kis
tan
 ] 
at 
15
:44
 28
 Ju
ly 
20
11
 
a functional representative for the CE team, even after repeated requests by the CE Project
Leader. In other cases they did not enforce the participation of their subordinates in CE
training, and did not sufficiently empower the functional representatives on the Pilot
Project. These observable phenomena were indications of a general lack of interest, and
this was accompanied by varying degrees of opposition in the face of potential threat.
Various proposals circulated by the CE Project Team pointed to a reduction in the
influence of the functions in projects, and a reorientation of functions towards a supporting
role in the development process (a significant move away from the existing functional
matrix structure in the company). Functional managers repeatedly asked about their future
roles and responsibilities, and some consequently refused to support the CE Team in
protection of their territories.
In contrast to the Technical Directors and the functional managers under them, project
managers – those whose role would become strengthened and more important under a CE
regime – were far less powerful in the company. They were ‘always begging and
pleading’ observed the Director of Quality Assurance, and they had limited voice in that
they were not directly represented on the Executive Committee. As a result, their influence
on the CE Project was minimal. The CE Project Leader was a middle-level technical
manager in the company (head of systems engineering) who initially expressed
enthusiasm about the project which he saw ‘as an opportunity to try something new . . . a
chance to tackle some of the problems (here) which have worried me for some time’.
However, he was young and inexperienced in dealing with HR issues and organizational
politics, and failed to ‘win over’ the Technical Managing Director, functional managers or
the OCC Project Leader as allies for CE. Instead of developing strong linkages with the
functions via their representatives on the CE Project Team and building a coalition of
support for the project, he dominated the CE Project Team and its process. He did not
ensure all members felt included, nor did he establish an agreed vision. He did not devolve
responsibility, and often suppressed the ideas of team members in favour of his own views.
In doing so, he steered his team in a direction that emphasized procedures and technical
solutions.
While he formally recognized the cross-functional team as a key to the success of CE,
he did not understand the full range of conditions that had to be put in place to make such
teams work. Although he focused on some aspects such as team training, meeting
management and team structure, he did not recognize that these were only a ‘subset of the
set of elements required to make teams truly effective’ (McDonough and Griffin 1997,
p. 11). He was not aware that unless teams were supported by an organizational context
that reinforced teamwork-fostering attitudes and behaviours, a high level of cross-
functional integration was not achievable. Most importantly, he did not consider the
creation of an appropriate organizational infrastructure for CE, with supportive HRM
policies and practices, as within the scope of the CE Project.
Unlike the CE project leader, the OCC Project Leader was more experienced and
influential. He was seen as one of the ‘rising stars’ and one of the ‘widely acknowledged
movers and shakers’ in the company, and ‘seem[ed] to make the going’ as an external
consultant put it. He also benefited from the TMD’s favouritism and sponsorship of his
project (which heightened both his and the project’s status). Beyond this, he was widely
respected by employees, and had a high reputation for being proactive and getting things
done. Although the OCC Project was officially of secondary importance, his selection
as project leader attached a high importance to the project. He possessed considerable
authority and, through his position in the company, he had easy access to senior
management, information, and other resources. In the face of opposition and resistance,
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such power resources help in the pursuit and achievement of valuable social and
organizational objectives (Buchanan and Badham 1999).
HRM was a key interest to the OCC Project Leader, both in that project and in his role
as Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department. He directly
influenced the position of HRM in Eurotech Industries. At the same time he ‘sidelined’
potential competitors and rivals, as in the case of the HR Department and the CE Project
Leader. Within the scope of the OCC Project he tried to raise the awareness of HRM
among the functional and business administration managers, and to strengthen the status of
HRM. He was aware of the minimal interest and limited knowledge of many of the middle
managers in HRM matters, and of their poor opinion of the HR Department. He criticized
the HR Department for ‘not [being] proactive enough’, for its more traditional personnel
focus, and for its lack of capability to fulfil a strategic role. At the same time he deprived
the department of the opportunity to get involved in the OCC Project, and to extend its
knowledge and influence. Despite his criticisms, he saw the HR Department’s main
responsibilities to be in hiring, firing, personnel administration and staff welfare. Finally,
although he recognized CE as a potential means of achieving cultural change in the
company, he did not support the CE Project.
On the ground: The CE Project Team
The CE Project Team members were junior company employees plus one more experienced
contractor, allocated to the project by their respective functional managers. Though all the
main functions were asked to send a representative onto the CE Project Team, only three
departments responded immediately, all in engineering. Once constituted, the team pursued
its task (at times with some vigour) through regular meetings, ongoing discussions with
other interested parties in the company, background research, and individual assignments,
all activities being under the direction of the Project Leader. At the outset, the project
appeared to have considerable potential to achieve major organizational change in the way
that the company managed its development projects. This potential was not realized, and
was possibly not realizable given the project’s context, approach and process.
A number of HRM-related factors at the project team level contributed to this
outcome. One can be seen in the composition and preparation of the CE Project Team.
As outlined earlier, the CE Project Team was made up of a relatively small number of
mostly junior employees with limited experience. They were all engineers, and they only
represented a limited number of the relevant functions in the company. The team was not
given any preparatory training, nor was it appropriately empowered within the company.
As a result, the CE Project Team focused more on technical issues (e.g., tracking customer
requirements during projects), and recommended technical solutions to recognized project
management problems such as communication difficulties and a lack of co-operation
among functions, while paying little attention to the more critical issues of HRM,
organizational and cultural change.
The CE Project Leader considered HRM issues to be largely outside the purview of the
CE Project, though this perspective changed somewhat at a later stage. He suppressed
the team members’ suggestions in this area, raised in discussions of various HR and
organizational issues such as the future scope of functional managers and the need for
team rewards. These HR issues were not included in the minutes, agenda, project tasks, or
the submitted CE Project proposals. The CE Project Leader discussed these proposals with
senior management. As the submitted proposals contained only issues accepted by the CE
Project Leader, he acted in a gatekeeper role, exercising control over the agenda and
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keeping potentially contentious issues (e.g., the future role of functional managers) out
of the process. He perceived CE to be ‘very closely linked to Systems Engineering’ and
the project was therefore ‘part of [his] normal job . . . in as much as most CE applies to the
design and development process’. Typical for his engineering background, the CE Project
Leader focused on technical and procedural solutions, but paid little attention to the HRM
aspects involved. The CE Project Team did not fully appreciate the human and social
implications of the implementation of CE (which for a company such as Eurotech required
nothing less than a major organizational culture change). Apart from HRM issues such as
team structure, training, and meetings, the CE Team did not consider other HRM issues in
any depth until one year after the project commenced. Due to their functional engineering
bias, the CE Team lacked any vision of how a strong project organization with high levels
of cross-functional integration could operate.
The play and its context
The consideration, or lack of consideration, of HRM factors in the course of the project
was largely attributable to the complex intertwining of the actions of these players.
Of crucial significance was not only the opposition to considering HRM issues in the CE
project, but also the fragmented and misaligned interests and perceptions of those
supporting HRM in the company. On the one hand, the actions of the TMD were clearly
influential in reducing the status, role and resources of the HRM function. Then there was
the selection of a CE Project Leader and team with a low level of political credibility and
HRM expertise, compounded by disengaged sponsorship of the project and little
organizational support in the face of a lack of interest or even opposition from other
directors. On the other hand, the various perceptions of, and interests in, HRM were not
aligned. The TMD was at various times more or less committed to at least espousing a
strategic HRM approach. The OCC Project Leader was interested in defining and lobbying
for a stronger role for HRM, but saw this as his ‘baby’, and showed no interest
in collaborating with the HRM Department or supporting the development of HR
considerations in initiatives such as the CE project. He ultimately failed to sway the TMD
to take his suggestions on board. The CE Project Leader had some interest in team building
and training, as well as cross-functional teamwork arrangements, yet failed to address
many of the organizational issues required to make this possible. Neither did he pursue a
strategy to gain support for this potentially substantive organizational change from other
managers and departments. The CE Project Team, although inexperienced in this area,
increasingly expressed the need to address a broader range of HRM factors, but this was
given very little consideration.
The actions of these organizational actors must, however, be set in their context. The
ways in which they framed the problems, the interests and intentions informing them,
the information, skills, capabilities and resources they possessed or could access, as well as
their room for manoeuvre in the project process, were all affected by situational social and
political forces. The perceptions and actions of the TMD were at least in part attributable
to the traditional engineering culture of a company that had developed on the basis of its
technical knowledge and engineering expertise. The company’s function-dominated but
project-oriented matrix structure provided the context that shaped the interests and
perceptions of the Technical Directors, the functional managers, and the CE project team
members themselves. The lack of HRM knowledge, interest and skills on the part of such
key players as the CE Project Leader and his team was a product of the way in which
career structures were established in the company. The clash between the HRM aspirations
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of the OCC Project Leader, the TMD, the HRM Manager, the CE Project Leader and the
CE project team were also rooted in the competing career structures and respective
backgrounds of these players.
While it is often difficult to capture and gauge how such factors play out in a case
study, the interaction between these different elements was revealed at a number of points.
The CE project team took the opportunity when the CE Project Leader was not present to
discuss and advocate the need for a more extensive range of HRM factors to be addressed
in the CE project, an activity that revealed the role of the team leader in repressing
consideration of such factors. That the TMD and the Executive Team did not take up
the recommendations of the OCC leader for the strengthening of the HRM function in the
company revealed the crucial role played by senior management in restricting such
considerations, even while espousing (in the case of the TMD) the need for a more
strategic and proactive HRM approach. However, these ruminations on the actions of
the players and their organizational context do not adequately explain the CE project
outcome. In order to capture the play of power that influenced the consideration of HRM
factors in CE at Eurotech, we need to understand not only the complex situational
dynamics but also the multi-faceted way in which power operates in such a context.
The four dimensions of power
Much of the foregoing discussion takes place at the level of the first two dimensions of
power; i.e. it is concerned with the behaviour of actors consciously deploying the resources
at their disposal to coerce or otherwise manipulate others and to control agendas. The result
in this case was a technically focused and organizationally restricted view of CE which
underplayed the HRM component. The analysis has, for example, pointed to the key role of
the Technical Managing Director in restricting the role of the HRM Department as well as
the scope of the CE project. Clear instances of the second dimension of power can also be
discerned, i.e. the active political manipulation of organizational processes to exclude
certain issues being given recognition and consideration. Examples of this include the CE
Project Leader playing a central ‘gate keeping’ role in preventing HRM-related issues
raised by the CE project team from reaching senior management and being considered by
them in discussions of what CE ‘should be’ in the company. Similarly, the head of the OCC
project prevented any linking of CE with HRM, both through his project role and in his
advocacy of a more strategic HRM orientation in the company. At the senior management
level, there was the lowering of the organizational status of the HRM Department through
the exclusion of that function from the Executive Committee.
The exercise of the third dimension of power – hegemonic processes through which
power is legitimated and meanings are managed so as to create acceptance of the status
quo and prevent conflicts from emerging – is at least partially reflected in underlying
conditions which favoured the adoption of a restricted approach to CE. Given the
hierarchical, highly specialized and technology-dominated mindset of a large engineering
organization traditionally supplying a single customer, it is perhaps only to be expected
that the ‘people centred’ aspects (i.e. those giving emphasis to HRM-related issues) of the
more organizationally-oriented CE approaches were never given serious consideration.
What appears to be the rigidity or inertia of bureaucracy reflects a particular pattern of
corporate domination under which the meanings attributed to initiatives such as CE are
shaped both by dominant interest groups and by the institutional framework within which
they operate. At Eurotech, the emergent view was that of CE providing an essentially
‘technical fix’ for identified organizational problems (involving, for example, software
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to facilitate information-sharing and cooperation across functions, and prescribed
procedures in company manuals to ensure coordination across functions and project
phases), while HRM issues were seen to be a quite separate consideration and outside of
the domain of CE as construed in the company. Through this interpretation, any significant
opposition to the idea of CE was avoided. At the outset, the functional managers were not
strongly opposed to CE, and generally they took little interest in it. Their ‘framing’ of the
world (Badham 2005) made such initiatives not so interesting for them – unless, of course,
organizational change proposals arising from the CE project began to challenge their own
functional power-bases. As we saw, there was some questioning of CE when such issues
came up, but significant organizational change and associated HRM reforms were defined
out of CE so these issues were more present in their ‘absence’.
Such issues are, however, made far more interesting and pertinent for the case when we
consider the fourth dimension of power, i.e. a more relational view of systems of power
which constitute individual actors as ‘subjects’ with their own sense of identity and
meaning. From this perspective, we extend our analysis by posing such questions as:
Where did the orientations of actors such as the Technical Managing Director and the CE
Project Manager come from? From whence did their ‘project of the self’ come? To answer
such questions we could turn to prevailing managerialist discourses. As elaborated by Du
Gay and others (Buchanan and Badham 2008), a powerful ‘discourse of enterprise’ is now
widely prevalent in contemporary organizations. Associated with this are inspiring
rhetorics and other inducements for organizational actors to become more flexible,
creative and enterprising in their organizational lives, to become more engaged with
innovation and change. Such a position supports the creation of structures and cultures that
celebrate, reward and beguile managers into adopting an ‘enterprising’ persona. At the
same time, embedded conditions can prevent such discursive and practical reconstruc-
tions. Traditional hierarchical, technical and masculine career hierarchies and ethos often
lead to ‘dinosaurs’ (a term popularly used by exponents of the enterprise discourse)
remaining in charge. Power plays in corporate engineering cultures create a far more
complex fashioning of the organizational self than any simplistic view of an ‘enterprising
self’ being constituted through organizational controls and career progression. If we take
the CE Project Leader, for example, he clearly was not ‘enterprising’ in this sense.
We could therefore ask: what was there about his educational background, his training, his
cognitive preferences, his career path that led him to a particular view of CE (as systems
engineering with a hint of ‘team-building’)? Why was he unable to effectively influence
either his senior managers or the team that he was working with? At one level this is a
matter of personality and individual socialization, but it is too widespread a phenomenon
among technical managers in large bureaucratic organizations to be explained solely in
terms of these factors, and to understand it requires a deeper and systemic view of power,
that is, ‘power is embedded in the very fabric of the system; it constrains how we see, what
we see, and how we think, in ways that limit our capacity for resistance’ (Hardy and Leiba-
O’Sullivan 1998, p. 460). So, it is clear that any complete explanation of the ‘absence’ of
HRM in CE initiatives in companies such as Eurotech requires that such processes
of subjectification, their origins and effects, are comprehensively addressed to reveal the
underlying power relations.
Conclusions: Analysing the politics of HRM ‘absence’
As we noted in the introduction, there has been a lack of in-depth studies of how HRM
considerations are dealt with in innovation projects. Where this has occurred, the analysis
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is often too superficial, failing to address the complexities of organizational power and
politics in influencing the role of HRM and the outcomes achieved (Watson 2004). What
this study has attempted to do is to use the case of Eurotech’s introduction of CE (an
approach to the management of design and development projects that potentially involves
major organizational change) to explore the ways in which HRM issues are actually
addressed or, as we have observed, neglected and ignored in process innovation.
The central role of organizational power and politics was raised in the introduction, and
explored with some particularity in the description of power, politics and innovation at
Eurotech. The case is, however, intended to be illustrative, exploratory and suggestive
rather than systematic and conclusive. The analysis of the case study data provided us with
insights into the processes through which important HRM issues are addressed, or not
addressed, in innovation. The four dimensions of power, and the role that they played in
creating an HRM ‘absence’, emerged in the course of a study initiated because of an
impression given by company managers that the HRM dimensions of CE would receive a
systematic and comprehensive treatment. On the contrary, they were given no such
treatment and these HRM dimensions – seen by many sources to be central for the success
of CE – were effectively ‘written out of the script’ during the course of the project studied.
The failure of external consultants and CE advocates to effectively influence Eurotech to
undertake such a treatment is itself an important dimension of the politics of innovation
projects (Badham 2007), and here we have sought to explain this paradoxical situation.
The main purpose of this study has been to provide an illustrative case that raises issues
such as those above for discussion by those concerned with HRM and its role in
organizational innovation. In developing a political process perspective for this field
of study, we have introduced a four-dimensional approach to power. We argue that
this approach can enrich our understanding of the complex dynamics of power in
organizational contexts characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity and flux (as is the case
in situations of significant process innovation). We believe that such an approach can
sensitize the researcher to the multi-faceted nature of power during data collection,
and stimulates analysis that delves beneath surface manifestations (i.e. of observable
behaviour) to achieve deeper understandings of the ways in which power operates within
organizations. One important qualification is in order here. As Clegg, Courpasson and
Phillips (2006, p. 221) observe, ‘The dimensional view of power resolutely dissects power
into layers. Analytically, the imagery is of the theorists digging deeper into the topic, but
the topic is rather static.’ Only by extending the analysis of multiple levels into a more
dynamic analysis of the practice of politics – power in action – is it ultimately possible to
grasp both the complexity and fluidity of the play of power (Buchanan and Badham 2008).
By showing some of the ways in which resources, processes, meaning and identity
intertwine at Eurotech, we have illustrated the beginnings of what this might look like in the
study of innovation and HRM. We invite others to contribute to the further development of
this perspective in an increasingly important area for management theory and practice.
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